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ESSAY
THREE DISCUSSIONS OF LEGAL ETHICS

*

INTRODUCTION

Ultimately, all questions of professional responsibility are
reducible to questions of personal ethics.' That this is so in the
case of a question on which no moral consensus exists (the question of how convinced of guilt a prosecutor should be before he
brings charges, for example) is obvious. In such situations, any
judgment made is necessarily an individual one that has reference
to no externally imposed standard. Less obvious is that the same
singular ethical responsibility obtains even in a case involving an
issue on which the profession has clearly spoken. To take the most
elementary example, Disciplinary Rule 1-102 (A) (1) of the
A.B.A.'s Code of Professional Responsibility states that "A lawyer
shall not . . . violate a Disciplinary Rule." Should a lawyer find
himself in one of those freakish situations in which the bland
Disciplinary Rules authoritatively speak to an ethical problem, his
decision to obey DR-l-102 (A) (1) and not to transgress the Code's
imperative may uncritically be seen as one for which he has no
personal responsibility, such conduct having been dictated by the
profession. Moral decisions, however, ought not to be justified
merely by appeal to authority. Even in cases seemingly governed
by an external norm there must be the additional, usually implicit judgment that the authority whose commands are to be followed is morally right. Responsibility for this commonly unarticulated decision must rest with the individual, in this case, the lawyer
who elects to obey the Code. Although the existence of a clear
Disciplinary Rule exerts a pressure on a lawyer's judgment not
present in the case of a question on which no professional agreement has been reached, the decisions made in each instance are in
an ultimate sense personal ones that draw deeply from the values
and tastes of the ethically-accountable individual.

0 In the past few years there has been a marked increase in courses dealing
with legal ethics and professional responsibility. Many law schools have made
such a course a required part of their curriculum. Although these courses vary
both in content and emphasis, it is hoped that this essay is illustrative of the kinds
of issues students are asked to consider. These three discussions constitute a greatly
expanded version of a final examination by a University of Pennsylvania Law School

student, Mark L. Alderman, written for the Law School's course, The Legal
Profession, taught by Professor Howard Lesnick.
I "Professional responsibility," "ethics," and "morals" are here used in the grand
sense of making and applying judgments of good, bad, right, wrong, and the like.
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That ultimate ethical responsibility always rests with a single
individual does not immunize personal moral judgments from the
scrutiny of others. When the decisions of individual lawyers on a
question of legal ethics coincide to an extent sufficient to constitute
a consensus within the profession, an attorney who elects not to
conform his conduct to that position may at times legitimately be
disciplined for that election. (The legitimate scope of disciplinary
action by the Bar is pursued below.) Even in such a situation, however, the individual process of decision is the fundamentally relevant
focus of study. The dissenting attorney must individually decide
not to obey the professional consensus. Further, the majority position from which he is dissenting must itself be seen as generated by
multiple individual judgments. A consideration of professional
responsibility, then, cannot be confined to an exegesis of the Code,
both because that document is and can be no more than a collection of individual decisions, and because obedience to that collection by a dissenter requires yet another personal judgment.
Rather, inquiry is most profitably concerned with the identifiable
factors that guide individual judgment-of which the professional
consensus, albeit important in those rare cases in which it is discernible, is only one.
A beginning in the direction of intelligible moral decisionmaking is to articulate with as much precision and candor as possible the reasons behind a particular judgment. To the extent
that a particular moral judgment is explained, rather than merely
announced, it becomes a less private affair. The explanation
necessarily reveals a bit of the personal principles and prejudices
that animate the decision and, if explanation is conscientious, factors undoubtedly will surface that others also have considered in
arriving at their personal positions. These shared considerations
constitute a common vocabulary for discussions of professional responsibility. As individual judgments are in this way exposed they
possibly will become less singular and more informed. Ultimate
singularity is inescapable; but, articulation by individuals of their
judgment process, which is what I have attempted in the following
discussions, increases the likelihood of our understanding one another's moral conclusions and perhaps thereby attaining a measure
more consensus on these mutual concerns.
I.
Consider first the case of a tax lawyer confronted with a client
whose announced intention is to evade the "gift in contemplation
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of death" provision of the tax laws. The question presented is
where to draw the fine line between advising as to the law and suggesting perjury or false evidence. Rather than pursue this question directly, I would like to look instead at what would be wrong
with simply giving the advice on how to avoid the gift tax-and
how such conduct differs from other lawyerly behavior. This inquiry will, I think, help refine certain unannounced and amorphous
notions that animate many discussions of legal ethics.
For a lawyer deliberately to counsel evasion of the tax law is
considered professionally irresponsible. I hope the consensus on
this is nearly unanimous; the existence of EC7-6 of the Code,2 to
the extent that it says anything, suggests so. On the other hand,
for a lawyer calculatedly to use existing evidence to establish in
court that a gift was not made in contemplation of death, despite
the lawyer's knowledge that the gift was so made,3 is not clearly
unethical. Indeed, my hunch is that a majority of tax practitioners
daily find such a state of affairs perfectly unobjectionable. 4 Why
does the advocacy of a course of action creative of evidence that will
rebut a statutory presumption that a particular gift was given in
contemplation of death [Situation A] bother most of us, while the
successful use of that same deceptive evidence in court by a lawyer
not present at its creation [Situation B] is not so troublesome?
Invocations of the lawyer's duty to see that the law is upheld will
not suffice because in both cases the effect of the lawyer's involvement is the same frustration of the tax law. Nonetheless, the intuition persists that Situation A is morally inferior to Situation B,
and articulation of that feeling is a pre-requisite to further linedrawing in this area.
2EC 7-6 reads in part:

Often a lawyer is asked to assist his client in developing evidence
relevant to the state of mind of the client at a particular time. He may
properly assist his client in the development and preservation of evidence
of existing motive, intent, or desire; obviously, he may not do anything

furthering the creation or preservation of false evidence. In many cases a
lawyer may not be certain as to the state of mind of his client, and in
those situations he should resolve reasonable doubts in favor of his client.
3 If the attorney learned of his client's true intention in the course of representation, there would be a confidentiality problem in the lawyer's refusal of the case.
To avoid this problem, assume that such knowledge was obtained outside the course
of representation.
4 1 say "hunch" because my knowledge of the realities of tax practice is negligible. Of necessity, much of this essay is written in the luxurious, hypothetical
manner known only to the academic community. I do not apologize for this
detachment, because I think it provides me with an impartial perspective. I do
caution, however, that some of my conclusions might best be approached with a
grain or two of salt at hand.

ESSAY

1977]

An explanation of the different moral textures of Situations A
and B is rooted for me in an obvious but insufficiently articulated
distinction that underlies a major portion of questions of professional responsibility. That truth is central to the legal profession
is unmistakable; witness Justice Sharswood in his nineteenth century
classic on Professional Ethics identifying it as "the polar star of a
lawyer." 5 Less clear, because infrequently discussed in the course
of routine practice, is that the universe inhabited by lawyers consists
of two related but distinct realms of truth: the truth that exists
in fact, and the truth that is provable in court. In an ideal world,
the two realms of truth would be precisely congruent; in the American legal system they are not. We have decided, for largely noble
reasons beyond the scope of this essay, that a "fight theory" of
adjudication is most contributive to the determination of in fact
truth. Implementation of this jurisprudential approach has required the development of elaborate decision procedures, such as
rules of evidence and allocations of variable burdens of proof, that
have resulted in the transformation of the courtroom into a realm
of truth where what can be proved according to the rules, not what
in fact happened, is true. We implicitly acknowledge this, for
example, in our style of criminal pleading: certainly no one thinks
a lawyers lies when he pleads a defendant "not guilty" regardless
of the in fact truth of the matter. 6
This is not of course the only way in which a justice system
could be structured. The Hispanic legal world, in contrast, evolving directly as it did from the Roman system without the intervening influence of Anglo-Saxon thought, insists to a considerably
greater extent on an identity of in fact and in court truth. Its
commitment to the rules of adjudication is discernibly less than
ours, and a result inconsistent with the in court rules but in conformity with the in fact truth is not an unheard-of occurrence.?
Here, however, the two realms of truth are often distinct. Consider
the situation presented by ABA Opinion 287 (1958): records of a
prior conviction of a criminal defendant awaiting sentencing have
been lost, although the defense attorney has discovered the earlier
conviction from his client; the judge asks the defendant if he has
previously been convicted and he replies that he has not been; is
it unethical for the attorney to remain silent? The ABA Commit5 G.

SuPSwooD, AN EssAY ON PnOFESSIONAL ETmcs 167 (5th ed. 1896).
6The Scots explicitly acknowledge this in court/in fact distinction in their
three-tiered verdict scheme: "guilty;" "not guilty;" and "not proven."
7 See, e.g., Moreno, The Cuban Revolution v. Batista's Pilots, in PorarrcAL
TreAts

(T. Becker ed. 1971).
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tee held that preservation of attorney/client confidentiality, one of
the rules of the game, requires the lawyer not to speak. The defendant has in fact a prior criminal record. This record has not been
established in court. For purposes of the American system of justice
the defendant has no record.
Thus, a lawyer in our system lives in a schizophrenic universe
composed of two kinds of truth. Each individual can, and must,
arrive at a personal resolution of this tension, and that resolution
will depend principally on an individual's appraisal of the final
justice of the adversary model of adjudication that underlies the
in fact/in court distinction. [I pause here to note my doubt that
a person is entirely free to resolve this tension however he so
desires and still remain a lawyer-my sense is that a person committed to perfect congruence of in fact and in court truth cannot
achieve such an identity in his career without unfairly foisting his
personal style on certain clients deserving of the benefits of the
adversary rules.]
Bringing this primary distinction back to the estate tax case,
we now have a crude vocabulary with which to discuss Situations
A and B. Situation B involves the participation of the lawyer only
in the in court realm of truth. Although the attorney has knowledge of the in fact truth, he is involved only in the courtroom
search for that truth. Situation A, in contrast, involves the lawyer
in both the in fact and in court realms. Unlike the attorney in
Situation B, the Situation A attorney is not merely presented with
a kernel of in fact truth,-that the gift was made in contemplation
of death-and a portion of evidence tending to disprove that truth,
and then asked to argue the misleading evidence in court. Rather,
he is presented with a kernel of in fact truth and asked to help create
in fact a portion of evidence that will disprove in court the truthful
kernel. The essential difference between Situations A and B, then,
is the timing of the lawyer's entrance.
Why this difference in timing, though, should constitute a
moral distinction between the two cases must now be considered.
In Situation B, all relevant facts are settled: all that remains open
is whether what is true in fact can be proved in court. In Situation
A, all is plastic; no facts that will be looked to as evidence have
yet been settled. The lawyer in Situation A can thus promote the
coincidence of in court and in fact truth, by declining to assist in
the creation of deceptive evidence, in a direct way not available to
the attorney in Situation B. Stated conversely, the attorney in
Situation A participates in the incongruence between in fact and
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in court truth in a more intimate way than does the attorney in
Situation B. Whether this higher degree of participation in the
promotion of an in fact/in court incongruence rises to the level of a
moral distinction is, as all such questions ultimately are, a matter
left to the personal conscience. That decision, however, need not
be utterly private. A crude scheme for evaluation having been
provided in the in fact/in court distinction, the individual determinations made and explained within that framework may now be
more intelligible to others. My hunch is that for most members
of the Bar the extents of involvement in Situations A and B are
different enough to render Situation A professionally irresponsible
and Situation B ethically acceptable. Such a distinction would be
consistent with the high commitment to the adversarialism in which
the in fact/in court division is rooted; once settled, as it is in Situation B, in fact truth apparently has little importance to the pure
"fight" theorists.
Other lawyers, to whom the eclipse of in fact truth by rugged
adversarialism is disturbing, would decline to handle not only Situation A but Situation B as well. Because this is not a criminal case
(which would present importantly different considerations); 8 because a person involved in an estate tax situation would very probably be the sort who could easily enough find another attorney; and
especially because their commitment to as high a degree of identity
between in fact and in court truth as is attainable consistent with
necessary rules (none of which is implicated here) is very strong,
these dissenters from the conventional view would find it distasteful
to participate in Situation B. They are uncomfortable with the
notion of knowingly participating in an in court/in fact incongruence in a case involving an estate tax because the stakes are not
important enough to them to overcome even the incremental harm
to the ideal of a unitary truth that is worked by this incongruence.
This conclusion is, I think, where I personally come out on the
question, although my academic convictions have never been tested
in the laboratory of practice. From my present perspective, and for
the reasons just discussed, I would prefer to avoid both Situations A
and B. Again, though, I must emphasize that in the final sense,
this is a judgment peculiar to my taste and temperament. Others
must of course decide for themselves and personally absorb the consequences of that decision.
8 See Wasserstrom, Lawyers As Professionals: Some Moral Issues, 5 Hur(A
RscnTs 1 (1975).

458

UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW

[Vol 126:452

II.
For my second discussion, I would like to consider yet another
version of the infrequent but "classic" question whether a lawyer
ethically may use false or perjured testimony. To put the problem
in its most confounding form, assume you are the attorney for
a young man who convincingly insists that although he was at his
father's closed store the night that it mysteriously burned down he
did not set the fire. Assume that none of the dilemma-avoiding
devices commonly urged as solutions to this problem are available.
Trial is imminent and you have been appointed by the court such
that graceful withdrawal is impossible. Your client insists on taking the stand. He refuses to plead the Fifth when asked by the
prosecutor if he was at the store that night; his intention is to lie
and say that he was not. Further, he demands that you ask him
this question on direct examination, arguing that its omission will
be a prejudicial signal to the jury. What should.an attorney in
these circumstances do? 9 I put the case so extremely because
evaluation of it serves to illuminate the ultimately personal character of all questions of professional responsibility, and further
generates vocabulary for discussing ethical issues in shared terms.
At first glance, this question seems settled for the profession by
the Code. DR7-102 (A) (4) unhesitantly states: "In his representation of a client a lawyer shall not knowingly use perjured testiDR7-102 (A) (4) is one of the rare
mony or false evidence."
absolute mandates in a generally ambiguous Code and for that reason comes to this question with a certain momentum for acceptance.
Indeed, Chief Justic Burger considers the categorical prohibition
of using perjured testimony to be so "fundamental to the integrity
9 Admittedly, the case I put is a highly unlikely one. Far more probable is a
scenario in which the client's intentions are revealed at a time when withdrawal
without prejudice is possible. In such circumstances I would advocate, as does the
ABA, refusal to represent the defendant if he cannot be dissuaded. Professor
Freedman argues that such action will simply insure eventual perjury by sending
the accused to another lawyer from whom the true facts of the case will be concealed. See Freedman, Professional Responsibility of the Criminal Defense Lawyer,
64 MicH. L. Rv.1469 (1969). This point seems to be an accurate prediction of
the consequences of a refusal to represent, and in strictly operative terms a refusal
will likely work the same concrete harm as will representation, i.e., the introduction
of perjured testimony. Nonetheless, I personally find refusal a morally superior
situation. In the case of representation, perjury is participated in by a defendant
and a lawyer. In the case of refusal and subsequent hiring of another lawyer
ignorant of the intention to lie, perjury is directly perpetrated only by a defendant.
Were I the lawyer to whom this client first came, and dissuasion seemed impossible,
I would prefer refusal because (1) abstract as the difference is, the system seems
less undermined by a defendant's perjury of which his attorney was ignorant than
one in which the attorney shares; and (2) I personally would be relieved of direct
participation in an unpreventable lie. These reasons are not beyond challenge;
they are, though, determinative for me.
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of our system" that "it can never admit of any exceptions, under
any circumstances." 'l Were this so, the issue would largely become one of allegiance to a clear consensus of professional opinion
rather than one of deciding how to act morally in an uncharted
area. Not surprisingly, things are not so clear as Burger suggests.
Despite the self-evidently true character that the Chief Justice
ascribes to this absolute rule, important arguments have been advanced that the blanket prohibition is wrong because it is corrosive
of the attorney-client relationship. The tension here, of course, is
between two values equally and inconsistently enshrined in the
Code: on the one hand, candor, and on the other, confidentiality;
between the lawyer's obligation as an officer of the justice system to
promote the coincidence of in fact and in court truth by disclosing
known perjury, and the lawyer's duty as counsel for a client to
encourage utterly uninhibited communication of all facts by keeping knowledge gained in the course of representation in the strictest
confidence. A recapitulation of the able cases made on all sides of
this issue is not necessary here. Sufficient for present purposes is to
conclude, as did Addison M. Bowman speaking of the present Code's
ancestors, that "the Canons of Ethics are.., so ambiguous and so
contradictory that they are of little or no help in resolving these
problems." 11
To what sources, then, is the attorney to look for resolution of
this problem? One source is that to which attention is instinctively
drawn: the nature of the judicial process. By this I mean not a
political evaluation, either normative or empirical, of that process
[these appraisals enter below] but rather a logical consideration of
what the model in theory is and what guidance it provides on the
candor/confidentiality tension. I detect heavy reliance on this
approach in Professor Freedman's well-known arguments. 12 Freedman, it seems to me, grounds his case in a certain vision of the
adversary process, from which he draws principles of right conduct.
Thus, confidentiality is celebrated above all else because for Freedman a trial is not a serene quest for "wise and informed decisions,"
as it is for Professor Noonan, 13 but is rather a fight, with the
lawyer's allegiance owed exclusively to his client. So far as I can
discern, Freedman consults no source other than his theory of ad10 Burger, Standards of Conduct for Prosecution and Defense Personnel: A
Judge's Viewpoint, 5 Am. Cnm. L.Q. 11, 13.
11 Bowman, Standards of Conduct for Prosecution and Defense Personnel: An
Attorney's Viewpoint, 5 Am. Cnmr. L.Q. 28.
12 See Freedman, supra note 9.
13 Noonan, The Purposes of Advocacy and the Limits of Confidentiality, 64
MIcro. L. 11Ev. 1495 (1966).
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versary justice: He posits our system as A, and then deduces that
all lawyers are B and should do C.
,Now, as an explanation of Freedman's personal ethics on this
question, his argument is intelligent and understandable. As a
model of moral deliberation, however, Freedman's approach is not
one that I can recommend. I seriously doubt that questions such
as that of representing a client who intends to commit perjury can
or should be resolved solely by deductive reference to a theory of
the judicial process. First, I have'no understanding of the theoretical operation of adversary justice from which -coherent principles of conduct can be deduced, and I cannot believe that I am
alone in this regard. Second, and more important, even if I were
able to draw such deductions, I would reject a purely logical analysis of this sort. Underlying the single-source deductive approach is
the unspoken notion that the person confronted with an ethical
dilemma such as this one exists only as a lawyer for purposes of the
moral question; the adversary system places certain demands on
lawyers, and those demands alone are relevant to what the person
confronted with a perjurious client should do. This extreme role
differentiation, as Richard Wasserstrom has heuristically characterized it,14 is unacceptable for the several reasons advanced by Wasserstrom in his perceptive piece. Rather than trace his fine discussion of this problem, I would instead like to pick up where
Wasserstrom leaves us. As I read him, Wasserstrom essentially
turns us back to our undifferentiated individual consciences for
evaluation of questions of legal ethics. The relevant moral agent
is not an abstraction known as a "lawyer" but rather a flesh-andblood person who happens to work in the law-an important, but
not controlling fact. The question thus becomes what considera-,
tions, other than an abstract notion of what the system expects of
lawyers, are important?
A consideration that seems to me relevant is that of the stakes
involved: what sort of potential for harm exists on each side of the
issue? In the present case, a refusal by the attorney to participate
in any way in the presentation of the perjury could not be implemented without adversely prejudicing the young man's defense.1 5
If, then, a decision is made not to further the perjury, the potential
14 See Wasserstrom, supra note 8.
15 Freedman is convincing in his argument that even the mildest implementa-

tion of such a refusal-conducting examination of the defendant in such a way as
to preclude the opportunity for him to lie in response to your question-is necessarily
harmful, especially where the issue is one strongly implicative of guilt like presence
at the scene of the fire. See Freedman, supra note 9, at 1477,
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harm is that the defense of an innocent young man will be undermined to the extent that he will be convicted of arson and suffer
severe consequences, possibly even long imprisonment. On the
other hand, if the perjury is acquiesced in, the harm is not potential but realized: false testimony has been knowingly introduced in
court by a member of the bar. This realized harm, however, is of
an intangible sort compared to the potential harm of conviction.
The injury inflicted by use of perjury in these circumstanceswould
be a philosophical one that does violence not to specific individuals
but to a collective commitment to in court truth as a means to
in fact truth; indeed, the practical bearings of this perjury would
be to decrease the likelihood of violence being done to a specific
individual. Philosophical injuries should not be generically dismissed as insubstantial; they can often be as damaging as a physical
blow. Here, however, the palpability of the potential personal
harm to the defendant seems indecipherably more compelling.
Consideration of the "stakes" factor, then, suggests that a decision must be made between a specific potential harm and a vague
realized harm. This choice seems guided by another consideration
suggested by the potential nature of the specific harm: the probability of that injury being worked by a decision not to further the
perjury. Evaluation of this factor is essentially a testing of a person's faith in the ability of our system to do justice in a case like
this. I use justice here to mean not punishing someone for something he did not do-a definition with which I expect no disagreement. My sense is that this defendant might very well be convicted if his defense is at all prejudiced, as I think it will be if his
lawyer tries somehow to avoid participation in the perjury.
That the conviction is not merely theoretically possible, but
rather is actually, palpably possible might be determinative for
defendant's counsel. If the relative weight that he places, as a person, on the moral wrong worked by conviction of an innocent
defendant is greater than the importance that he attaches to preventing diminution of an abstract commitment, as it might be for
an attorney who shares to a significant extent the Hispanic insistence on an ultimate identity of in fact and in court truth, then
defendant's attorney has all but made his decision. If the defendant did not in fact set the fire, then he should not in court be held
to have done so. If such a disposition requires, as it by hypothesis
does here, the passive participation in perjury envisioned by this
case, then a lawyer committed to a unitary truth could decide
on these facts to do as Freedman suggests, although for significantly
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different reasons: he could put the defendant on the stand just a
he would any other.
Such a decision, if reached by informed deliberation of the
sort suggested above, would be an utterly situational one, addressed
only to the particular extreme case presented here: an innocent
defendant in a criminal case who himself insists on the perjury at
a time when withdrawal without prejudice is impossible. Different
facts could call for an opposite conclusion. Two situations that I
think even the staunchest advocates of a unitary truth would find
importantly different from the main hypothetical can be sketched.
The first is the easy case in which a confessedly guilty defendant
insists on perjuring himself. A lawyer committed to a congruence
of in fact and in court truth would not, for obvious reasons, participate in the perjury there but rather would follow the avoidance
devices in the ABA Standards Relating to the Defense Function,
Section 7:7.1" This position, of course, raises problems. It is subject to all Freedman's criticisms that the ABA approach is destructive of the attorney/client relationship because, in breaching
to any extent a client's expectation of confidentiality, future communications between lawyers and clients are chilled. More telling
yet is the criticism that in drawing a line between guilty and innocent perjurious defendants here the attorney not only promotes
lying, by providing an incentive for clients deceitfully to protect
their innocence, but he further co-opts the function of the court
system by attaching serious consequences to his perception of a
defendant's guilt or innocence in advance of that verdict being
rendered at trial by jury. Granted, a degree of co-option persists
in the conclusion that the case of a "guilty" defendant is easier than
that of an "innocent" one. I can only respond with candor, not
logic: we deal here with decisions on the fringe of legal practice,
decisions that defy ideal resolution; for the reasons discussed above
(especially the ultimate identity of in fact and in court truth) I
personally can respect a decision to put on the stand and unrestrainedly examine a witness who intended to perjure himself if
non-prejudicial withdrawal were not possible and if counsel deeply
believed on the basis of vigorous investigation that defendant was
innocent (though I might not make that same decision myself); I
cannot support a decision to do so where counsel believes in his
-6 The avoidance devices advocated by the ABA Standards are: (a) advise the
client against false testimony; if unsuccessful, (b) withdraw from the case; if not
feasible, (c) refuse to engage in direct examination and refuse to argue the false
testimony to the jury.
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heart and mind that defendant is guilty because the comparative
harms would then be very different.
A second situation that I find unmistakably distinct from the
arson hypothetical is a case like In re Metzger,17 where a*lawyer
himself initiates the use of false evidence-to make it dramatic say
the creation by the attorney of evidence unmistakably establishing
a bogus alibi for a defendant he believes in his soul is innocent. As
the degree of the attorney's participation in the deceit increases, the
realized harm to our system's commitment to in court truth as a
means to in fact truth becomes incrementally greater. Although
the practical effect of a deception is the same regardless of the perpetrator, the philosophical effect is aggravated commensurate with
the extent of an attorney's involvement, because the trust invested
by our system in lawyers as officers of the court is increasingly
breached as counsel enlarges his fraudulent contribution. Because
the countervailing potential harm to the defendant-conviction,
worked by the lawyer's non-participation-remains constant, increased participation in fraud by a lawyer at some point constitutes
an injury deleterious enough to be, for me, more objectionable
than a mistaken conviction. Assuming that the "stakes" and "probability" factors are the same as in the hypothetical arson case (if
either were less the case against creation of false evidence would be
easier to make; if either were more, the case would be harder to
make) the Metzger-like deceit would be on the wrong side of the
line for me. A balance must be struck, and despite the horror I
would experience by seeing young man wrongly convicted, I would
not fabricate evidence probative of an alibi for him. I offer this
hypothetical not because it is exemplary of principled and rational
decision-making in the area of legal ethics; it is not. Rather it
demonstrates the unavoidably and intensely personal nature of
these judgments. Ultimately, all that can be said is "Here are my
factors; here is my line."
The line that I have hypothetically drawn in the principle
arson case discussed above is controversial. Indeed, I have no doubt
that some important lawyers-the Chief Justice among them-consider it to be a positively indefensible line. I would like quickly
to present and attempt in terms to meet what I take to be the
primary objection to the position that I ascribe to my hypothetical
lawyer devoted to a congruence of in fact and in court truth. Objections to the use of deception to prove the truth are several; yet, I
27 31 Hawaii 929 (1931).
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sense that they are all essentially grounded in the value judgment
articulated in the maxim "the end does not justify the means."
The use of lies in court, this argument contends, is so pernicious a
means that no end-not preservation of the attorney-client relationship, not even acquittal of an innocent defendant-can justify such
conduct. Proponents of this position often neglect to detail the
assumptions and predictions underlying their conclusion, a negligence that is understandable because the statement feels so selfevidently right. Despite this quality of moral obviousness, however,
I have trouble accepting the proposition that no end ever justifies
deceitful means.' 8 Such a categorical statement is troublesome for
me because judgment on these issues does not proceed abstractly
but rather involves in each decision a specific end and a specific
means. Characterizing the end in the arson hypothetical as the
acquittal of an innocent defendant is not sufficiently precise for
meaningful analysis. As discussed above, the relevant end includes
within its network of considerations the stakes involved, the probabilities of the case, etc. Similarly, statement of the means as the
use of deceit is inadequate. What kind of deceit is contemplated?
What degree of participation in that deceit will the lawyer assume?
These are among the multiplicity of factors that should enter the
ends/means calculus. Individuals may, of course, repeat this situational calculus in enough hypothetical cases to induce that no
circumstances exist in which a deceitful means would be justified
by an end, no matter how noble. My response is twofold: (1) Induction of this sort, suspect even in the hard sciences, is especially
dubious in the realm of legal ethics where each situation is likely
discrete enough to be tantamount to a unique moral universe. I do
not, indeed on my own theory of ultimate ethical individualism
I could not, deny that informed moral deliberation can result for
some in the erection of an absolute principle. I only counsel
caution and flexibility. (2) Even if an ethical absolute does exist
in this area for some, it need not for all. Although the standard
of the profession may be set, of necessity, by majority rule-by which
I mean that a lawyer might be disciplined were he to decide to
examine his client here in the face of a clear consensus that to do
so is wrong 19-that standard, while legitimately coercive, is not automatically dispositive of the ethical question. I close here where I
Is Nor can I accept the converse; that certain ends justify any means. Ends
and means are indissolubly linked along a continuum and an otherwise desirable
end can be transformed into a less compelling one if attained by repulsive means.
19 A line of inquiry worth noting but impossible to pursue here is whether such
decisions to act contrary to the Code for conscientious reasons might profitably be
discussed in the well developed language of civil disobedience.
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began above: morality is a personal enterprise. Each individual
should strive to make his decision informed and intelligible, as I
have tried to do above, and must subject his judgment on certain
matters to the scrutiny of a community into which he has entered;
but, the ultimate, as opposed to the consensus, evaluation of what
is right and what is wrong is that person's alone.
III.
In the discussions above, I attempted to articulate certain
considerations that do and ought to guide individual judgment on
matters of professional responsibility. I now wish to take a case
in which that personal decision process has resulted in both a conclusion probably contrary to the Code and an intention nonetheless
to act on that conclusion. Assume as Dean Redlich does in #10
of his ProfessionalResponsibility: A Problem Approach (1976) that
an attorney is asked by a newspaper to cover a race discrimination
case of great public interest. The judge presiding at the trial is
not noted for his sympathy with suits of this kind, or for his erudition in civil rights matters. In a newspaper column critical of
rulings by the judge that seem erroneous as a matter of law, the
attorney/reporter writes that the way the judge is conducting the
case is "a travesty of justice. He is not only woefully ignorant with
regard to constitutional matters, but his racial bigotry is permeating
his conduct of the entire trial". This column was written after
informed deliberation by the attorney on identifiably relevant considerations [the stakes involved; the probabilities of the case, etc.],
including EC 8-6 of the Code, which states that "while a lawyer as a
citizen has a right to criticize such officials [judges] publicly, he
should be certain of the merits of his complaint, use appropriate
language, and avoid petty criticisms, for unrestrained and intemperate statements tend to lessen public confidence in our legal
system." [emphasis supplied]. Careful evaluation led the attorney
to conclude that although he could not be certain of the merits
of his complaint, and although his language was probably not of the
"appropriate" sort envisioned by the Code, publication of the
article was justified. I am not here concerned with cataloguing the
factors that entered the attorney's moral calculus, nor with appraising the wisdom of his decision to criticize in just this way. The
dimension of legal ethics I wish to discuss here is one distinct from
any questions of sound deliberative methods or wise final decisions.
What I would like to consider is: can disciplinary action legally be
brought against this lawyer on the theory that he acted contrary to
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the principles expressed in EC 8-6? 20 The question of what legal
constraints on professional discipline exist is one that is infrequently
addressed in law school ethics courses, the emphasis ordinarily being
placed on interpretation of the Code; yet to the extent that ABA
disciplinary measures represent state action-and the extent is surely
considerable-I find important portions of the Code to be impermissible limitations on the constitutional rights of lawyers. EC 8-6 is,
I think, one of these unconstitutional sections.
As suggested, certain moral decisions of individual attorneys
can legitimately be scrutinized by the profession.2 1 Obviously, this
scrutiny necessitates a consensus position-which most often means a
bare numerical majority-on a particular question. Without at least
a 51% agreement among lawyers on the irresponsible character of a
specific kind of behavior no discipline for that conduct is practically
possible and lawyers are left utterly to their own moral codes. If the
requisite agreement is reached, however, scrutiny is practically possible and the next question is whether discipline is legally possible.
Circumscription of an area within which professional discipline is
legitimate-in the sense of legal-must eventually look, I believe,
to the Constitution for guidance. This is so because to the considerable extent that the ABA disciplinary apparatus is for constitutional purposes state-imposed discipline, the ABA is legally
constrained, as is the state, almost exclusively by the Constitution.
The controlling nature of constitutional limitations can be seen
by considering an example at each extreme of the legality-ofdiscipline spectrum. Take as a clear example of legitimate professional discipline the case of disbarment proceedings against a
defense attorney who personally murdered the prosecution's star
witness. Most would agree, I take it, that such a person, in addition to being punished criminally, could legally be disciplined by
the profession. No legal objection would be raised because the
Constitution does not prohibit the ABA-as-state from punishing this
conduct; or, put conversely, nothing in the Constitution grants a
person the right to murder prosecution witnesses. At the other
extreme, assume a consensus of the profession expressed in a Dis20

The technical answer to this question is "no" because the charge of mis-

conduct here is grounded in an Ethical Consideration which, unlike the Disciplinary
Rules, is not mandatory. The Ethical Considerations are, however, guides to the
interpretation of the Disciplinary Rules and a Bar Association with a mind to do so
undoubtedly could work the "guidance" of EC 8-6 into an existing Disciplinary
Rule and proceed against the attorney in that way.
21 The legitimacy of professional discipline involves considerations beyond the
legality of such action; however, I deal here only with the constraints on professional discipline imposed by law.
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ciplinary Rule calling for the wearing of navy blue, three-piece suits
by all attorneys at all times. An ABA disciplinary proceeding
against a lawyer who wore a khaki suit to the office would, I trust,
be enjoinable under the Fourteenth Amendment as an invasion
of the constitutionally protected privacy right to control of personal
appearance. Such a Disciplinary Rule is not justified by any state/
ABA interest sufficiently compelling to overcome the individual's
privacy right, and the Constitution would therefore disenable the
Code from regulating a lawyer's appearance in this way.
Moving away from these polar cases and towards the shadowy
center regions of this question of constitutional constraints on professional discipline, the issue of the First Amendment rights of
lawyers is encountered. In his headnotes to Problem 10, Redlich
asks "does the First Amendment apply to lawyers?" The question
would be laughable if there were not a discernible tendency in the
Code to respond "NO" at critical points. Most of Canon 2, dealing
with advertising and solicitation, seems constitutionally infirm in
light of the recent decision in Bates v. State Bar of Arizona.22 Similarly, the bulk of Disciplinary Rule 7-107, on Trial Publicity, is
for me violative of the First Amendment standards announced by a
unanimous Court in Nebraska Press Association v. Stuart 23 (the
"gag order" case), although I am troubled by the Sixth Amendment ramifications of that result.24 Also raising serious constitutional problems is EC 8-6, quoted above. I leave aside discussion
of the procedural objection that the operative terms of EC 8-6"appropriate language," for example-are intolerably vague and for
that reason cannot constitutionally support a disciplinary action.
Also I will not detail the reasons why EC 8-6 would be unconstitutional on its face if applied to criticism of a judge by a non-lawyer;
I expect no dissent from that conclusion. What I wish to consider
is the substantive scope of EC 8-6, to see if it is confined to an area
within which the profession may legitimately regulate the speech
of its members; and, rather than laden the discussion with First
Amendment precedent, I would like to proceed at a largely theoretical level.
A useful approach to this question of the constitutionality of
EC 8-6 is the "stakes" inquiry: what is the harm that likely will
result (a) if lawyers are permitted the same freedom of expression as non-lawyers generally; and (b)if lawyers are allowed lesser
2297

S. Ct. 2691 (1977).

U.S. 539 (1976).
In fairness I must note that in the Stuart case the Court expressly did not
reach the question of the applicability of its reasoning to the legal profession.
23427
24
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free speech rights than others? Certain groups in our society are
allowed lesser First Amendment rights than other groups because
the harm worked by granting them full freedom of expression is
too great to be tolerated. Although the Supreme Court has recently diminished the free speech rights of some of these groups to
an excessive extent [especially prisoners and military personnel],
certain diminutions are necessary. A soldier in combat, for example, may constitutionally be -disciplined for engaging in speech that
would be untouchable if engaged in by a civilian. Now, is the
criticism of the judge outlined above-speech that is unarguably
protected by the First Amendment when uttered by an "ordinary"
person-subject to discipline when presented by a lawyer because
the harm to protectible state interests is distinguishably greater? I
think not.
The justification for EC 8-6 offered by the Code is that "an
adjudicatory official, not being wholly free to defend himself, is
entitled to receive the support of the bar against unjust criticism
. . . for unrestrained and intemperate statements tend to lessen
public confidence in our legal system." Lessened public confidence
in the legal system is, then, the harm that allegedly will result if
lawyers are as free as others to criticize judges, and this harm purportedly justifies cutting back the freedom of expression of attorneys by stating that they act at their peril when they speak without
certainty of the merits of their claim or with inappropriate language. Granted, criticism of judges by lawyers is more likely to
lessen confidence in the legal system than is criticism by non-lawyers;
lawyers are presumed by the public to speak with a special expertise
on judicial matters, and the likelihood is that even when they speak
with uncertainty of their claim, or with inappropriate language,
they will be listened to and believed in a way that non-lawyers
would not be. Because lawyers in this sense occupy a position of
public trust, a strong-although paternalistic-argument can be
made for imposing a greater burden of prudential speech on them.
Were no considerations other than this potential for an immeasurable but credibly harmful lessening of public confiderice relevant,
EC 8-6 would be constitutionally unobjectionable.
Countervailing considerations, however, are of course relevant.
Foremost among these is the other half of the "stakes" inquiry:
what harm is likely to result if lawyers are held to a higher standard
of accountability for their speech than other persons? The practical effect of stricter liability for lawyers, such as that imposed by
EC 8-6, unquestionably seems to be that a chill is placed on the
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inclination of attorneys publicly to criticize judges; indeed, such
deterrence was intended to accompany EC 8-6. This chill is, I
believe, positively harmful. Important here is the other side of the
argument that because lawyers' criticisms of the judiciary are likely
to be believed they must be carefully scrutinized by the profession.
Precisely because such criticisms are presumptively credible I find it
desirable that criticism of judges by lawyers be encouraged, not
chilled. Among all possible critics of the American system of
justice, lawyers uniquely are in a position to understand the working of the judiciary and to expose those failures of the system that
undeniably occur. Professor Alan Dershowitz in a recent critical
review of a book, written by a journalist, on civil liberties in
America 25 articulated the consequences of the "code of honor
among lawyers . . . not to reveal the truth about the judiciary":

There is a high price paid in leaving to non-lawyers the
primary responsibility for educating the lay public about
the inadequacies of our courts. Practicing lawyers who
are daily exposed to the law have a unique insider's understanding of the subtle relationships among the rules,
institutions and personalities that comprise our legal system.

Many books by non-lawyers . . . sometimes fail to

grasp these subtleties.
I agree with Dershowitz that entrusting primary criticism of the
judiciary to non-lawyers is costly and I think that the possibility of
a lessening of public confidence in the legal system as a result of
robust criticism of the judiciary by lawyers, while worthy of serious
attention, does not finally justify the "high price" exacted by chilling
guidelines like EC 8-6. Because this "high price," i.e., the indirect suppression by ABA/state action of incisive information about
the functioning of the justice system, is the kind of price the First
Amendment disenables government from charging absent more
compelling justification than is offered here, I do not think'that
EC 8-6 can withstand constitutional scrutiny.
With the Code's position on the question of criticism of judges
by lawyers invalidated, the discussion comes full circle. The individual attorney is left with his personal moral code to guide
his conduct. To the extent that he engages in the sort of informed
deliberation groped towards in essays I and II above, his decision
is likely to be both more intelligible and agreeable to others. But,
ultimately the morality of his conclusion is his alone to judge.
25 N.Y. Times, November 28, 1976, § 7, at 1.

